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REMOVING THE STIGMA OF ARREST:
THE COURTS, THE LEGISLATURES
AND UNCONVICTED ARRESTEES
'Society punishes criminal conduct by incarceration and moral condemnation.' Prior to imposing sanctions for the commission of criminal acts, the accused must be proven guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt in accordance with adequate procedural safeguards. Yet each
year thousands of unconvicted arrestees are subjected to the same
stigma which society imposes on those who are convicted because the
records of all arrestees, whether convicted or not, are retained and
disseminated by law enforcement agencies.
When an individual acquires an arrest record 2 the data is sent to
the state police and to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 3 The
United States Attorney General is required by statute to exchange
these records with "authorized officials of the Federal Government,
the States, cities, and penal and other institutions. ' '4 Despite this fairly
restrictive scope of permissible dissemination, many persons and institutions who are not authorized recipients gain access to arrest infor-

1. Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 401, 402-06
(1958). Professor Hart, in the context of prescribing what legislatures should consider
when specifying particular conduct as criminal, suggested that these were the two basic
elements of criminal punishment. He asserted that a crime should be based on blameworihiness and hence justify the punishment of social condemnation that results.
2. The term "arrest record" as used throughout this comment means both records of
identification, such as fingerprints, photographs, measurements and voice prints, and the
official record of arrest which indicates the suspect's name, time and place of arrest and
the specific charge.
3. These steps are provided for by statute in many states. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 30.31 (Supp. 1972).
4. 28 U.S.C. § 534(a)(2) (1970). If the records are disseminated outside these authorized recipients, the exchange is subject to cancellation. Id. § 534(b). Although there
are no decisions construing the term "cancellation," numerous interpretations are possible. It could mean that the exchange program between the Attorney General and the
violating agency would be terminated. Two possible constructions would be more desirable. Upon cancellation the Attorney General could require the violating agency to return all records received and to retrieve those records disseminated outside authorized
bounds. Cancellation could also be construed to authorize private suits in federal court
by aggrieved persons to retrieve records illegally disseminated, or to recover damages
for injuries sustained as a result of illegal dissemination.
The Attorney General has specified by regulation that member banks of the Federal
Reserve System and those banking institutions insured by the Federal Savings and Loan
Insurance Corporation are among those "other institutions" with which the FBI is required to exchange identification records. 28 C.F.R. § 0.85(b) (1965).

659

Washington Law Review

Vol. 47: 659, 1972

mation. 5 Complicating this pattern of unauthorized dissemination has
been the development of integrated information systems for law enforcement agencies. The FBI's National Crime Information Center
has been described as "the initial element of a broader crime information network that eventually will link all of the nation's law enforce6
ment agencies into a single data system."
Retention and dissemination of arrest records of unconvicted arrestees has a variety of adverse effects on them. These range from embarrassment when a past arrest is publicized to discrimination in employment, licensing and bonding. A survey of employment agencies in
New York City indicated that seventy-five percent refused to refer an
applicant who possessed an arrest record. 7 Schwartz and Skolnick
5. Courts have taken judicial notice of the accessibility of police files to private individuals. See, e.g., In re Smith, 310 N.Y.S.2d 617, 620 (Family Ct. 1970); Menard v.
Mitchell, 328 F. Supp. 718 (D.D.C. 1971). In Menard Judge Gesell pointed out two
principal reasons for unauthorized access. The first is the FBI's liberal exchange program. Any state, county, city official or agency that has anything to do with law enforcement is eligible to receive arrest information. Id. at 721. Second, there is a lack of
supervision over what is done with the arrest records disseminated. "it is apparent that
local agencies may on occasion pass on arrest information to private employers." Id. at
722. Commentators have criticized the ease with which private individuals can acquire
arrest records. See, e.g., Karst, "The Files": Legal Controls Over The Accuracy And
Accessibility Of Stored PersonalData, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 342. 365 (1966).
6. Miller, PersonalPrivacy /i The Computer Age: The Challenge Of A New Technology In An Information-Oriented Society, 67 MICH. L. REV. 1089. 1192 (1969).
Computerized information systems threaten to have a multiplier effect on the adverse
consequences of an arrest record. Any person with access to the data could obtain a
complete dossier on an individual and subject him to discrimination.
The utilization of computers and data banks in government record-keeping and the
potential effects on individual citizens has been a subject of recent controversy. Miller
states:
[M] any people have voiced concern that the computer, with its insatiable appetite
for information, its image of infallibility, and its inability to forget anything that
has been stored in it, may become the heart of a surveillance system that will turn
society into a transparent world in which our homes, our finances, and our associations will be bared to a wide range of observers.
Id. at 1092.
Proposals for a National Data Center, which would accumulate a wide range of government data, have been critized by commentators who fear the impact on man's privacy. Most commentators have favored a national system but one equipped with legal
and technological safeguards to prevent abuse. See Comment, Privacy And Efficient
Government: Proposals For A National Data Center, 82 HARv. L. REV. 400 (1968).
Authors have suggested that input to such a system should be restricted to statistical information with arrest records and FBI reports excluded to protect personal privacy. See
Project, The Computerization Of Government Files: What Impact On The Individual?,
15 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 1371, 1400 (1968). Another commentator has urged that raw investigative files, like FBI reports, should be kept confidential because of their inaccuracy.
but that access to arrest information should be available to eliminate the informationpeddling from within the police departments. Karst, supra note 5, at 367.
7. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, REPORT: THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 75 (1967).
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found that the individual acquitted of criminal charges experienced
approximately the same degree of difficulty in obtaining a job as the
person convicted of the same offense. 8 This discrimination is often the
product of questioning in job interviews and on job application forms.
Approximately fifty percent of the states have arrest-oriented job application forms, as do seventy-five percent of the local governments. 9
The Duncan Report 10 "detailed the enormous influence dissemination
of [arrest] records ... on a person's job opportunity."" Further discrimination occurs in those states which have laws or regulations
which limit the issuance of business and occupational licenses. Discovery of an arrest record by a reviewing agency often results in the
discretionary refusal to grant a license.' 2 One study determined that
former arrestees in the United States experienced a much greater de3
gree of discrimination than did their counterparts in foreign countries.'
If an unconvicted arrestee is later charged with a different offense,

his prior arrest record may significantly affect the disposition of the
8. Schwartz and Skolnick, Two Studies of Legal Stigma, 10 Soc. PROBS. 133,136
(1962). The collateral consequences of a criminal conviction, particularly in the area of
employment, have been severe. For an extensive discussion of the collateral consequences of a criminal conviction see Special Project-The CollateralConsequences of a
Criminal Conviction, 23 VAND. L. REV. 929 (1970); Comment, Employment Of Former Criminals,55 CORNELL L. REV. 306 (1970).
9. Zeitz and Borkow, Barrierto the Employment of Former Offenders: Local Government Job Applications, January 4, 1971 (unpublished manuscript in Georgetown
University Law Center, Institute of Criminal Law and Procedure), cited in Comment,
Discriminatory Hiring Practices-PrivateRemedies, 17 VILL. L. REV. 110, 112-13
(1971).
10. This report may be found appended to the opinion of the court of appeals in
Morrow v. District of Columbia, 417 F.2d 729, 745 (D.C. Cir. 1969). REPORT OF THE
COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE EFFECT OF POLICE ARREST RECORDS ON EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (1967).

11. Id. at 731. According to the Duncan Report, 3500 arrest records a week were
being disseminated to employers who drew their own conclusions from the often difficult to decipher data. The Morrow court noted that the effect on minority groups was

especially severe because of their initial difficulty in obtaining a job coupled with their
higher incidence of arrest. See, e.g., Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc., 316 F. Supp. 401
M.D. Cal. 1970) which discussed the higher incidence of arrest among blacks. The court
held that basing a hiring decision on the plaintiffs past arrest record was unlawful under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
12. See Comment, DiscriminationOn The Basis of Arrest Records, 56 CORNELL L.
REV. 470, 474-5 (197 1) and statutes cited therein.
13. See Hess and Le Poole, Abuse of the Record of Arrest Not Leading to Conviction, 13 CRIME & DELINQ. 494 (1967). This particular article is especially interesting
because the authors compare the effects of the arrest record in the United States and foreign countries. The authors conclude that "thirty-eight other countries do not countenance the general discrimination against persons with arrest records ....A 'record' in
these thirty-eight countries lists only convictions ..... Id. at 500. The authors stated:
The civilized world generally acknowledges presumption of innocence as a human
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charge. A record may influence the prosecutor's decision to prosecute,
the amount at which bail is set, the election14 to negotiate a plea and
the sentence to be imposed upon conviction.
This comment will first present the arrest record debate. The traditional justifications for the present system will be compared with those
underlying the new approach to the treatment of unconvicted arrestees. Second, two proposed tests will be examined to determine which
can satisfy the needs of both sides of the debate. Finally, state statutes
and a proposed federal act will be analyzed to determine whether current or proposed statutory law can provide a realistic solution to minimize or eliminate the stigma resulting from arrest record dissemination.
I.

THE ARREST RECORD DEBATE

A.

Justificationsfor the TraditionalRecord Keeping System

Traditionally, the records of unconvicted arrestees have been retained and disseminated indiscriminately. The primary argument advanced for maintaining the present record keeping system is that vital
law enforcement purposes are being served. This argument was lucidly presented in Voelker v. Tyndall.15 In Voelker, the plaintiff had
been acquitted and, claiming his right to privacy was being violated
by the retention of the records, demanded the return of his fingerprints. The Indiana court refused to aid the unconvicted arrestee and
held that the purpose of retention is to promote the public safety and
welfare, and that it was the duty of the police to retain the records to
prevent crime and apprehend criminals. t6 Although the justifications
right. Yet, the United States affords this right less protection than countries abroad:
indeed, in the United States, protection of this human right is inferior at times to
that in communist countries .... While the United States claims it respects the right
to the presumption of innocence, it has not fully realized that the very essence of
the presumption of innocence requires that it be applied in all cases where the
person has not been adjudicated guilty.
Id. at 501-02.
14. See Comment, Retention and Dissemination of Arrest Records: Judicial Response, 38 U. CH. L. REV. 850,855 (1971) and the notes cited therein. See also
Menard v. Mitchell, 430 F.2d 486, 490-91 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
15. 226 Ind. 43, 75 N.E.2d 548 (1947).
16. The court stated the reason for retaining the data: "The purpose is single. clear
and quite salutary-to promote the public safety, by achieving greater success in preventing and detecting crimes and apprehending criminals." Voelker, 75 N.E.2d at
550-51.
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offered in Voelker do not comprise an exhaustive list,' 7 they are representative of those utilized to deny relief to unconvicted arrestees. 18
Advocates of the present system cite several additional factors.
Thirty to fifty percent of those arrested in major cities on felony and
misdemeanor charges are not prosecuted. 19 It is argued that many go
free because of legal technicalities developed by the Warren Court in
the name of procedural due process.2 0 Lack of evidence or the inability to find a crucial witness often prevents conviction of guilty arrestees. 21 Since the guilty often go free, treating unconvicted arrestees
like convicted offenders for record keeping purposes serves a protective function. Another argument is that a constitutionally valid arrest

results in a lawfully obtained public record. In addition, by providing
proof of what transpired, the public record provides documentation
for the arrestee who is later questioned or wishes to bring an action
22
for false arrest.
The traditional arguments have two analytical problems. First,
there is no attempt to substantiate the claim that protective functions
are being served by retention. Second, while it is recognized that the
individual rights of unconvicted arrestees are being infringed, there is
17. Courts have been hesitant to disturb the broad discretion of law enforcement
agencies and have justified retention on the grounds that the guilty often go free on technicalities. Cf. Fernicola v. Keenan, 136 NJ. Eq. 9, 39 A.2d 851 (1944). It has even been
stated that a record of arrest is helpful to an arrestee because it demonstrates no conviction took place. Sterling v. City of Oakland, 208 Cal. App. 2d 1, 24 Cal. Rptr. 696
(1962).
18. It is interesting to note that these same justifications are utilized to justify compiling an arrest record immediately after an arrest. Two early cases, Downs v. Swann,
Ill Md. 53, 73 A. 653 (1909), and Mabry v. Kettering, 89 Ark. 551, 117 S.W. 746
(1909), laid the foundation for later decisions permitting the collection of criminal
identification data. In both decisions claims of potential harm were rejected and arrest
records were found to facilitate the identification of criminals. The courts held that no
violation of individual rights occurred because the inconvenience was'an inevitable cost
of citizenship.
19. L. HALL, Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE, & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
9 (1969). This figure is at best only a rough estimate. The authors note the absence of
accurate statistical data on the disposition of criminal cases and the wide variance
among jurisdictions. Id. at I n.b.
20. Cf., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388 (197 1) (Burger, C. J., dissenting).
21. The role of prosecutorial discretion in this context cannot be overemphasized.
The prosecutor's function is accusatorial. Before bringing charges he will have made a
determination of guilt which he asks the community to agree with. Prosecutors like to
maintain a high conviction rate and not have their determinations of guilt reversed.
Therefore where the evidence against a defendant is weak, the prosecutor may often
drop the charges rather than risk defeat. J. Skolnick, Social Control In The Adversary
System, II J. CONF. RESOL. 52, 58 (1967).
22. Spock v. District of Columbia, 283 A.2d 14, 18 (D.C. App. 1971).
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no attempt to reconcile that vital interest with the legitimate needs of
law enforcement.
B.

Emerging Theoriesfor Change

Recent decisions have indicated the emergence of a new approach
to the treatment of unconvicted arrestees. The law enforcement justifications for the traditional system have been questioned and theories of
privacy and the presumption of innocence have been utilized to justify
positive relief for unconvicted arrestees.
1.

A Challenge to the Law Enforcement Rationale

Decisions that have ordered expungement of arrest records have
been infrequent until recently and have often involved exceptional
circumstances. In Wheeler v. Goodman,2 3 an arrest pursuant to a vagrancy statute was held unconstitutional because the statute was being
used to harass youths. The court ordered expungement of the unconvicted arrestees' records, reasoning that no criminal identification or
investigation function could be served since the plaintiffs had not
24
committed crimes.

The Wheeler case evidences a fundamental shortcoming in the
treatment of unconvicted arrestees, i.e., the failure to distinguish
among them. Thus, all unconvicted arrestees have been subjected to
the retention and dissemination of their records irrespective of the
particular circumstances of their arrest or release. Some arrestees are
released upon a determination that no crime was committed. Some
may have been the subject of an unconstitutional arrest. On the other
hand, some arrestees are acquitted after having run the gamut of the
criminal process. Others are released when a prosecutor dismisses the
case for lack of evidence. Still others are released without any determination of guilt or innocence because the system cannot process
every case. Rather than treating all unconvicted arrestees alike, it is
urged that the particular circumstances of each arrest and release
23.

306 F. Supp. 58 (W.D.N.C. 1969). Accord, Hughes v. Rizzo, 282 F. Supp. 881

(E.D. Pa. 1968); United States v. McLeod, 385 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1967) (mass arrests of
blacks were found to be intended to interfere with their right to vote).

24.

There were additional reasons for granting equitable relief in Wheeler: society

would not be protected by the retention of the arrest records; future misuse was likely:
and the extreme misbehavior of the police warranted rectification.
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should be examined to determine whether relief is warranted. A recent
federal decision, Morrow v. District of Columbia,25 suggested this
approach.
In Morrow, the plaintiff, who had been arrested for swearing at a
police officer, got his case dismissed and then moved to have his arrest
recoid expunged. The lower court refused to expunge, but issued an
order prohibiting the dissemination of plaintiff's record to anyone,
including law enforcement agencies. On appeal, the retention issue
was not considered. Instead, the court questioned whether it should
follow the Duncan Report's 26 recommendation that the dissemination
of arrest records to employers be prohibited but the dissemination to
law enforcement agencies allowed. Although the case was remanded
to decide that issue, the circuit court authorized a flexible case by case
27
approach:
The inquiry might better be... what valid law enforcement purposes
are served by retaining and disseminating to law enforcement agencies
the arrest record in a particular case? Thus the focus would include
the reasons for dismissal or other disposition of the case (if dismissal
on a technicality there might be better reason to keep the records intact than if dismissed for lack of evidence; further in the rare case of
malicious prosecution there seems no valid reason for maintaining the
record). Another focus of inquiry would be the nature of the crime;
some types of crime may follow a pattern, in which case it would be
more reasonable to retain a record of who has been repeatedly arrested in a certain area for such a crime.
The Morrow court prescribed two important steps in determining
whether to limit the dissemination of the arrest record of an unconvicted arrestee. The first is to consider each unconvicted arrestee individually. The second, as was done in Wheeler, is to make a determination of what law enforcement purposes, if any, are being served. Morrow, though mentioning privacy as a basis for the approach it suggested, did not explain its reliance on that concept.
2.

The Right to Privacy
Warren and Brandeis first asserted that privacy is a legally enfor-

25.
26.
27.

417 F.2d 728 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
See notes 10-11, supra.
Morrow, 417 F.2d at 742.
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cible right in 1890.28 They were concerned with the public exposure
of an individual's personal affairs to the community as a byproduct of
an advancing civilization. 29 The right to be left alone to enjoy life and
to prevent matters thought private from being made public was considered the essence of privacy. 3 ° The basic attribute of the right to privacy has been described as "the individual's ability to control the flow
of information concerning or describing him."-3
Although privacy as a legal notion does not fit neatly into a coherent conceptual framework, specific invasions of the right to privacy
can be identified and prevented. Prosser suggests that two types of
invasions of privacy are: 1) to publicly disclose embarrassing facts
about an individual or 2) to place him in a false light. 32 The United
States Supreme Court early expressed its desire to secure protection
34
for personal rights, 33 but it was not until Griswold v. Connecticut
that privacy was declared to be a fundamental personal right. The
Court held that the Constitution protected the right of marital privacy. Justice Goldberg, in a concurring opinion, stated that privacy
was a fundamental right which a state could not abridge simply by
showing that a statute had a rational relationship to a state purpose35
a compelling interest was required.
Preventing the retention or dissemination of arrest records on a
theory of privacy is consistent with current construction of that right.
28. Warren and Brandeis, The Right To Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
29. The authors stated: "The intensity and complexity of life, attendant upon advancing civilization, have rendered necessary some retreat from the world, and man,
under the refining influence of culture, has become more sensitive to publicity, so that
solitude and privacy have become more essential to the individual .. .- Id. at 196.
30. The authors concluded: "It is the unwarranted invasion of individual privacy
which is reprehended, and to be, so far as possible, prevented." Id. at 215.
31.

Miller. .supra note 6, at 1107.

32. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960). Two other types of invasions are intrusion into the plaintiffs solitude and appropriation of the plaintiffs name
or likeness for one's advantage. In response to Prosser's analysis see Bloustein, Privacy
As an A.pect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 962.
981 (1964).
33. An example of this is Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). The Court
held that the essence of immunity from an unreasonable search was: "the invasion of his
indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and private property, where that
right has never been forfeited by his conviction of some public offense .... ." Id. at 630.
34. 381 U.S. 479(1965).
35. Id. at 497. Goldberg applied this "compelling state interest" test to the Connecticut statute and found that discouraging extra-marital relations was a legitimate state
concern, but more careful drafting was needed to prevent intrusion into the privacy of
all married couples. This doctrine of narrowing the scope of the statute to prevent infringement of personal liberties has been used frequently by the Court. See, e.g., Note.
Le.ss Dra.stic Mean.%and the First Amendment, 78 YALE L.J. 464 (1969).
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Uncontrolled dissemination provides private employers and others
access to arrest records of unconvicted arrestees. These individuals
lose the right to be left alone. They become the subjects of public and
private scrutiny. The basic attribute of privacy, the ability to control
the flow of information about oneself, is lost. Under either of Prosser's
thedries, dissemination of arrest information when the agency or individual is cognizant of the adverse effects on the unconvicted arrestee
is an invasion of his privacy. For example, it is now universally recognized that placing an arrestee's picture in a rogues' gallery results in
36
an invasion of his privacy. The leading case is Itzkovitch v. Whitaker.
The police were prevented from displaying an unconvicted arrestee's photograph along with those of convicted offenders in public
view. The court enjoined such a display holding it to be an invasion of
the plaintiffs private rights. The court stated that in such instances the
right of privacy is absolute and that no public good can be derived
37
from exhibiting the photograph of an honest man in a rogues' gallery.
Subsequent decisions have adopted the view pronounced in Itzkovitch, recognizing that the same dangers to the individual presented by
the rogues' gallery are presented by the mere retention of his arrest
records in the police files because of the accessibility of those files to
38
the public.
The privacy argument has also provided the basis for relief to unconvicted arrestees in conventional fact settings. In United States v.
Kalish,39 the unconvicted arrestee moved to expunge and destroy photographs and fingerprints taken when he refused induction into the
army. He had been discharged without conviction. The court ordered
the record destroyed holding that the arrestee's personal privacy was
invaded and his dignity affronted as long as there was a "criminal record" retained. The court added that retention constituted an attack on
40
the arrestee's character and reputation.
36.

37.

115 La. 479,39 So. 499 (1905).

Id. at 500.

38. See Itzkovitch v. Whitaker, 117 La. 708, 42 So. 228 (1906), where the court
stated that posting the picture would be permanent proof of dishonesty; Schulman v.
Whitaker, 117 La. 704, 42 So. 227 (1906); State ex rel. Reed v. Harris, 348 Mo. 426,
153 S.W.2d 834 (1941); State ex rel. Mativity v. Tyndall, 224 Ind. 364, 66 N.E.2d 755
(1946), finding that placement in a rogues' gallery was serious violation of privacy;
Downs v. Swann, Ill Md. 53, 73 A. 653 (1909), stating that police had no right to needlessly or wantonly injure any suspect by putting his photograph in a rogues' gallery.
39. 271 F. Supp. 968 (D.P.R. 1967).

40. Other decisions have adopted the Kalish approach and utilized the justifications
offered there and in the exceptional circumstances decisions in ordering expungement.
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The niche of the right to privacy in the constitutional framework
has remained a mystery since the Griswold decision. 4 1 Nevertheless,
privacy has been the principal theory relied upon by courts granting
relief to unconvicted arrestees. Another theory for relief, firmly rooted
in our legal tradition, is the presumption of innocence.
3.

The Presumptionof Innocence
The principle that a man is presumed innocent until proven guilty

See, e.g., Kowall v. United States, 53 F.R.D. 211 (W.D. Mich. 1971). The issue in Kowall was whether a federal court, in granting relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to a federal
prisoner, could order the expungement of his arrest record. The court held that expungement could be ordered under section 2255 in appropriate circumstances. Before expungement could be ordered the court required a careful analysis of each arrestee's case.
The critical determination was whether "the public interest in retaining the record of a
specific arrest is clearly outweighed by the dangers of unwarranted adverse consequences." Id. at 264.
In In re Smith, 310 N.Y.S.2d 617 (Family Ct. 1970),juveniles sought expungement of
their records. The New York court ordered the expungement of the plaintiffs' surnames
from the records but allowed retention of the records for statistical purposes. This novel
remedy was formulated after a realistic appraisal of the attitudes concerning arrest records and the adverse effects of retention on unconvicted arrestees. The court noted that
the prohibitions on accessibility were not rigidly enforced, and that employers and employment agencies openly discriminated against former arrestees reasoning that "where
there is smoke, there must be fire." Id. at 620. Given the severity of the consequences to
juvenile arrestees and the express mission of the New York Family Court to help and
protect youths, the court concluded: "in the economic world that respondents must prepare to enter, there tends to be a presumption of guilt from an arrest record, rather than
the presumption of innocence that in the world of legal theory prevails until conviction."
Id. at 621.
The rationale behind this enlightened approach to juvenile record retention was
grandly stated in In re Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523 (1954) (dissenting opinion):
The grim truth is that a Juvenile Court record is a lengthening chain that its riveted
possessor will drag after him through childhood, youthhood, adulthood and middle
age ... it will be a witness against him in the court of business and commerce, it
will be a bar sinister to him in the court of society ... it will be a sword of Damocles hanging over his head in public life, it will be a weapon to hold him at bay as
he seeks respectable and honorable employment.
Id. at 529. Both courts and commentators have recognized the grim consequences of a
juvenile arrest record and sought to preserve confidentiality and prevent a stigma from
attaching. See, e.g., T.N.G. v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3rd 767, 484 P.2d 981, 94 Cal.
Rptr. 813 (1971) (court enabled the juvenile to deny he had been retained, arrested, or
subjected to juvenile court proceedings); Comment, Juvenile Delinquents: The Police,
State Courts, and Individualized Justice, 79 HARV. L. REv. 775 (1966) (the author indicates that the major purpose of juvenile court legislation is to have hearings and court
records kept confidential); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), where the Supreme Court
recognized the stigma of an arrest record to both a juvenile and an adult, id. at 23-24.
It is submitted that this enlightened approach is equally applicable to many adult
arrestees. Not only are the disabilities comparable, but the stigma can afflict the
unconvicted adult arrestee for the remainder of his life.
41. For a discussion of the many implications of Griswold see Symposium---Comments on The Griswold Case, 64 MICH. L. REv. 197 (1965).
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is a fundamental one in the administration of our criminal law.42 Although its exact origin is uncertain, both ancient Greek and Roman
law maintained this concept. 43 The underlying basis for the presumption of innocence is that man is basically good, and is innocent of any
crime until the contrary is proven by legal evidence. 44 The role of the
preiumption in the case of the unconvicted arrestee is a confusing one.
Although the principal source of confusion has been whether the presumption of innocence is evidentiary in nature or merely allocates the
burden of proof in a criminal trial,4 5 the critical question regarding
the unconvicted arrestee is whether or not his innocence is still presumed after the disposition of his case.
The United States Supreme Court has frequently referred to the
presumption of innocence and indicated that it is the concept that
American jurisprudence prefers. 4 6 The Court has never stated directly
that the presumption of innocence must continue to be operative after
an unconvicted arrestee is released. However, in United States v.
Fleischman47 the Court held that the presumption of innocence continues to operate until overcome by proof of guilt. In Schware v.
Board of Bar Examiners48 the Court held that the mere fact of arrest
42.
43.
44.

Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895).
Id. at 454.
Slovenko, Establishing The Guilt Of The Accused, 31 TUL. L. REV. 173 (1956).

45. Commentators agree that the presumption of innocence is not a true legal presumption but rather an assumption. In Ashford and Risinger, Presumptions, Assumptions, and Due Process in Criminal Cases: A Theoretical Overview, 79 YALE L.J. 165
(1969), the authors defined a legal presum, tion: "Most are agreed that a presumption is
a legal mechanism which, unless sufficient evidence is introduced to render the presump-

tion iioperative, deems one fact to be true when the truth of another fact has been established." Innocence is assumed because the policy of the law prefers it. See Note, The
Presumption Of Innocence In Criminal Cases, 3 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 82, 84 (1941).
At that point any agreement stops and three principal views emerge .regarding the ef-

fect of the presumption of innocence at a criminal trial. A number of courts follow the
view espoused in Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 932 (1895), and treat the presump-

tion of innocence as evidentiary in nature. The major authorities in Evidence, Thayer
and Wigmore, suggested that no presumption and, a fortiori, no assumption, could be
legal evidence. Once an opponent offers evidence to the contrary, the presumption or
assumption disappears. See Falknor, Notes On Presumptions, 15 WASH. L. REV. 71, 72
n.5 (1940). Thayer and Wigmore concluded that a predisposition to innocence merely

allocates the burden of proof. A third position agrees with the conclusion that the presumption of innocence allocates the burden of proof and yet serves the additional purpose of cautioning jurors not to draw conclusions from the fact of an arrest. See Orfield.
Burden of Proofand Presumptions in Federal Criminal Cases, 31 KANSAS C. L. REV.
30, 57 (1963).
46. See Note, The Presumption Of Innocence In CriminalCases, 3 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 82, 84 (1941).

47.

339 U.S. 349 (1950).

48.

353 U.S. 232 (1957).
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had little probative value in showing misconduct and that any probative force of an arrest was dissipated upon the arrestee's release. Not
only is the presumption of innocence preferred, but guilt is not inferred when an arrest does not lead to conviction.
The presumption of innocence has only been used twice as a basis
for relief to unconvicted arrestees. 49 In those instances the judges
failed to discuss either its historical or precedential background.
Given the Supreme Court's preference for the presumption of innocence, however, further development of and reliance upon that concept
can be expected in the arrest record area.
Courts which have granted relief to unconvicted arrestees have
adopted a more enlightened approach to the problem. Not only are the
facts of each arrestee's arrest and release examined, but the justifications
underlying the law enforcement arguments are challenged. Most important, however, is the recognition that the individual rights of the
unconvicted arrestees warranted protection. A test that can be applied
uniformly to unconvicted arrestees and insure the service of vital law
enforcement purposes while minimizing the deleterious consequences
of the present system would be desirable. Two possible tests have recently been proposed. The following section will examine those proposed tests to determine which can satisfy the needs of both sides of
the arrest record debate.
C.

Proposed Tests to Resolve the Arrest Record Debate

Tests to be applied to unconvicted arrestees seeking relief were
formulated in Spock v. District of Columbia5 0 and Eddy v. Moore.5 1
Spock involved seventy-five appeals which were consolidated to test
the power of the District of Columbia courts to order the expungement of arrest records. The court required that the arrestee make an
"affirmative demonstration negating culpability." Once that test was
met the court would not order expungement, but would order that all
copies of the arrest record be changed to reflect that fact. The court
reasoned that this would be sufficient to eliminate the harmful classification of arrest records by effectively distinguishing those arrestees
49.
In re Smith, 310 N.Y.S.2d 617 (Family Ct. 1970); Eddy v. Moore, 5 Wn. App.
334, 487 P.2d 211 (1971).
50. 283 A.2d 14 (D.C. App. 1971).
51. 5 Wn. App. 334, 487 P.2d 211 (1971).
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who had not been convicted and hence prevent the adverse consequences of retention.
In Eddy, the plaintiff was arrested, fingerprinted and photographed. After charges were dismissed at trial, the plaintiff sought the
return of his records on a theory of privacy. The defendant police
chief offered the traditional justifications for retention, namely, statutory authority to retain information 52 and the absence of a statute
compelling the return of the records. The court, after stating that the
presumption of innocence was basic to our legal system and determining that the state had been granted too much discretion "to determine what records are needed to effectuate the law enforcement func54
tion,"'53 focused on the right of privacy:
[The question is] ...the legality of the existence of a record of an
acquitted person's fingerprints and photographs in police files. The
determination of that question, in turn, hinges directly on whether
there is a constitutional right of privacy in an acquitted person's
fingerprints and photographs.
The court held that no rational basis for retention remained because
there was a "direct correlation between the loss of individual privacy
and the retention of arrest records." 5 5 An arrestee who had been acquitted was determined to have a greater visibility to law enforcement
because of his record. 5 6 The court pronounced the "compelling necessity" test. The court held that the right to privacy in the accused's
fingerprints and photographs should be balanced against the state's
need to retain the records and that "absent a compelling showing of
necessity by the government" return "is a fundamental right implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty... well within the penumbras of the
specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights .....57 It was further held
that the Washington statutes governing the retention of fingerprints
and photographs were too limited: "failure to provide for return of the
[records] upon acquittal, absent a compelling showing justifying their
'58
retention, is a constitutionally defective omission.
52.
53.
54.
with an
55.
56.
57.
58.

WASH. REv. CODE § 72.50.140 (Supp. 1971).
Eddy, 5Wn.App. at339,487 P.2dat214.
Id. at 342, 487 P.2d at 215-16. The court apparently equated a dismissal at trial
acquittal.
Id. at 342, 487 P.2d at 216.
Id. at 344, 487 P.2d at 216.
Id. at 345, 487 P.2d at 217.
Id. at 346, 487 P.2d at 218.
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A federal district court in Menard v. Mitchell 9 applied a compelling necessity test similar to that enunciated in Eddy. In Menard on
remand, 60 the federal district court faced the issue of whether to order

expungement of the arrest record or to limit dissemination to law enforcement agencies. The court refused to order expungement, stating
that there was a "compelling necessity to furnish arrest data to other

61
law enforcement agencies for strictly law enforcement purposes.
The court held, however, that the FBI could not disseminate arrest
records outside the federal government "for employment, licensing or

62
related purposes whether or not the record reflects a later conviction."

Menard fills a significant gap left by the Eddy test. Eddy said
nothing about restricting the use of arrest records once a compelling

necessity is demonstrated. By strictly limiting dissemination of retained records, Menard insures they will be used only for purposes
that justified their retention. Eddy and Menard can be combined to

provide a test which can satisfy both vital law enforcement purposes
and the individual rights of unconvicted arrestees. This can be dem-

onstrated by a comparison of the two tests in the context of privacy
and the presumption of innocence.

The Spock test, and the law enforcement arguments that underlie
it, do not implement the policy behind the presumption of innocence

but conflict directly with it. The arguments for retaining the present
59. 328 F. Supp. 718(D.D.C. 1971).
60. The District of Columbia Circuit Court in Menard v. Mitchell, 430 F.2d 486
(D.C. Cir. 1970), had remanded the case to determine whether probable cause existed at
the time of arrest. The plaintiff had sued for removal of both his fingerprints and notation from the FBI's criminal identification files. Menard claimed that the information
would become available to potential employers and law enforcement agencies and be
used against him. 430 F.2d at 488. The circuit court stated unequivocally that if the
plaintiffs arrest had lacked probable cause, there was no "constitutional justification for
its memorialization in the FBI's crime files." 430 F.2d at 492. The federal district court
on remand found that probable cause for Menard's arrest had existed. See the analysis
of the probable cause issue in Comment, Retention and Dissemination of Arrest Records: Judicial Response, 38 U. CI. L. REV. 850, 855 (1971). As for lawful arrests.
where the FBI learns of later disposition without conviction, the court stated that there
may be a duty to supplement the FBI files. 430 F.2d at 492.
Several casenotes have been written on the circuit court's opinion in Menard.See 49
N.C.L. REV. 509 (1971); 20 AMER. L. REV. 189 (1970); 17 WAYNE L. REV.995 (1971).

61. Menard, 328 F. Supp. at 727. The law enforcement purposes purported to be
served by arrest records are: ".. .uncovering criminal conduct, they play a significant
role in the prosecutor's exercise of discretion, they greatly aid in setting bond, determining sentences an [sic] facilitating the work of penal and other institutions of
correction." Id. at 727.
62. Menard, 328 F. Supp. at 727. The court did hold that the Federal Government
could use the records for limited employment purposes in the aid of national security.
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record keeping system are based on the assumption that the unconvicted arrestee was in fact guilty and would have been proven to be so
had not a lack of evidence, prosecutorial discretion or a legal technicality prevented it. The unconvicted arrestee is considered an unconvicted criminal from whom society must be protected. The Spock test
reinforces this presumption of guilt by requiring the unconvicted arrestee affirmatively to negate his culpability.
The Eddy-Menard test, on the other hand, by requiring the government to justify its retention of arrest records, reinforces the policy behind the presumption of innocence. Accordingly, the presumption attaches to the accused and continues after his release. Thus, under the
Eddy-Menard test, the government retains the burden of proof and is
required to overcome the presumption of innocence to retain a record
as it must to obtain a conviction.
The Spock test places the burden directly on the unconvicted arrestee to protect his fundamental right of privacy. In contrast, the
Eddy-Menard test requires the government to prove its need for records of unconvicted arrestees before retention is allowed. The latter
approach is preferable because it will serve law enforcement purposes
where they constitute a compelling necessity. Where such purposes do
not exist, Eddy-Menard, unlike Spock, insures the unconvicted arrestee's right to privacy. Eddy-Menard will balance the state's need to
retain the records against the individual's right to have them expunged. By requiring the government to prove that its interest is
greater, Eddy-Menard will *insure that the privacy of unconvicted arrestees is not violated before their due process rights have been afforded.
Eddy-Menard will reduce the prejudicial effects which result from the
present system of retention and dissemination by limiting retention to
those cases where it can be justified by legitimate governmental interests.
D.

Applying the ProperStandard

The Eddy-Menard test is clearly preferable. It reverses the presumption of guilt which the Spock test perpetuates. It insures that the unconvicted arrestee's fundamental right of privacy will not be violated
without due process by requiring the government to show a compelling
necessity to retain his records. The Eddy-Menard test automatically
affords individualized treatment for each unconvicted arrestee because
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retention will be based on the particular circumstances of his arrest
and release.
The Eddy-Menard standard must be strictly applied to insure its
effectiveness. If the government fails to meet its "compelling necessity" burden, expungement must be ordered. If the government sustains
its burden and justifies retention, dissemination must be strictly limited. The same compelling government necessity that justifies retention
should also limit dissemination of the records retained. The arrest
records of unconvicted arrestees should not be disseminated beyond
those recipients whose function it is to fulfill the law enforcement purposes which initially justified retention.
Assuming the Eddy-Menard test is applicable, either total expungement of an arrest record or strict limitation of its dissemination is required. The critical issue is how to insure the effectiveness of the
prescribed remedy. A comprehensive federal scheme is needed
because the scope of the problem extends beyond state boundaries. A
system must be structured which strictly limits the dissemination of
arrest information at the outset and then enables retrieval and destruction of all copies of the record if expungement is ordered. The system
must also insure that dissemination is limited to authorized recipients in
cases where retention is justified. This system would prevent unauthorized interests from obtaining the arrest records prior to conviction.
The proposed scheme must provide realistic sanctions. Some information leaks are inevitable. However, an active enforcement program
by the record gathering agencies should minimize unauthorized dissemination. Strong sanctions would discourage violations and obviate the
necessity of private suits to enforce the sanctions by individuals who
are unaware of their rights or cannot afford to enforce them.
The following section will explore legislative efforts to provide effective remedies in the area of arrest record discrimination.
II.

LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE: THE QUEST FOR AN
EFFECTIVE REMEDY

A.

State Statutes

Sanctions, good draftsmanship and an understanding of the types of
problems an unconvicted arrestee faces are the essential elements of an
effective expungement system. Several states have taken steps to
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alleviate the unwarranted penalties imposed on unconvicted arrestees.
These well-intentioned efforts have undoubtedly afforded relief to a
number of unconvicted arrestees, yet such relief is seldom complete
because once a record is disseminated across state lines or to a federal
agency, retrieval is usually precluded.
Maine, Oregon and Washington have enacted confidentiality statutes which purport to strictly limit the accessibility of identification
records. Maine simply declares the records confidential 63 while Oregon provides that fingerprints, photographs, records and reports are
confidential and not accessible to public inspection. 64 The Washington
statutes6 5 specifically address the problem of the unconvicted arrestee.
The Washington scheme distinguishes between records of identification (fingerprints, etc.) and the record of arrest. The records of identification are declared to be confidential and damages, including injury
to reputation, are provided for against any person who wilfully violates the confidentiality statute. Any agency maintaining arrest records
must note the disposition of the charges against the arrestee and send
the same information to all agencies to which the records were disseminated. Despite the progressive posture of these statutes, the Washington Court of Appeals in Eddy v. Moore6 6 found their scope too
limited. There was no provision for the return of fingerprints and photographs, a constitutionally defective omission. Only Washington has
a statutory remedy for violation of its confidentiality statute. There is
no language in any of these statutes to encourage an unconvicted arrestee to bring an action. Nor is there any provision for internal enforcement. All three states allow law enforcement agencies to retain
the arrest records without demonstrating necessity. This perpetuates
the invasion of privacy and the resulting discrimination against unconvicted arrestees.
Connecticut and Illinois have enacted statutes which attempt to
provide more complete relief to the unconvicted arrestee. The Connecticut statute67 permits the erasure of an arrest record under certain
circumstances and provides that the party securing erasure is considered not arrested ab initio. The Illinois statute6 8 provides that all
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 1631 (1959).
ORE. REV. STAT.§ 181.540 (1963).
WASH. REV. CODE §§ 72.50. 120-.170 (Supp. 1971).
See note 51, supra.
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-90 (Supp. 1971).
ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch. 38, § 206-5 (Smith-Hurd 1970).
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photographs, fingerprints or other records of identification shall be
returned to the arrestee upon his acquittal or release. It further provides that an unconvicted arrestee can petition the local court to have
his arrest record expunged from the official records of the arresting
authority. There are several shortcomings in these statutes that impair
the effectiveness of the remedy. The Connecticut statute has been criticized as follows:li:)
[T] here is no certainty that the erasure does eliminate all evidence of
arrest .... An order of erasure will eliminate the court records and
may eliminate the records in the local police station, but unless a person
specifically requests it, the fingerprints and arrest records with the state
police and the FBI will not be removed. Thus the damages of a false
arrest may occur years later and sometimes without the plaintiffs being
aware of it.
The Illinois statute provides for the return of all identification records
but includes no method for retrieving the records that have been disseminated to other law enforcement agencies or private individuals.
The statute also distinguishes between records of indentification (fingerprints, etc.) and the record of arrest as does the Washington statute.
Both records should be regarded as equally dangerous to the unconvicted arrestee and both should be returned or expunged to insure
effective relief. It should be no more difficult for the unconvicted arrestee to eliminate the identification records than the record of arrest.
Finally, the expungement provided for the arrest record is too limited
because it applies only to the arresting authority and does not include
the agencies to which the records may have been disseminated.
States have attempted to limit potential discrimination based on an
arrest record by requiring confidentiality or authorizing the return or
expungement of the potentially damaging records. Yet these isolated
efforts cannot provide the comprehensive relief needed; federal law is
the answer.
B.

A ProposedFederal Statute
The Offender Rehabilitation Act7 0 is presently being considered by

69. Satter and Kalom, False Arrest: Compensation And Deterrence, 43 CONN. BJ.
598. 612-13 ( 1969).
70. 117 CON(,. RE(. S16,622 (daily ed. Oct. 20, 1971). S2732, 92d Cong.. 2d Sess.
(1971).
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the United States Senate. The Act is designed to prevent the use of
past criminal records to discriminate in employment, licensing and
bonding against past offenders and arrestees that were not convicted.
The theory is that once the offender has paid his debt to society he
should return to the economic community as a full partner. Nullification of his criminal record would be an incentive to the former offender to live lawfully and thereby avoid recidivism. The same theory
is applicable to unconvicted arrestees because the adverse effects on the
arrestee's employment opportunities are similar when his arrest record
is disseminated. In addition, treating an unconvicted arrestee like a
criminal can encourage his participation in criminal activity-a
71
self-fulfilling prophecy.
The Act provides that any person who was found not guilty of an
offense for which he was indicted, or who was released after arrest,
can apply to a federal district court to nullify all records relating to his
arrest, indictment or trial.7 2 The effect of nullification for the individual who is not convicted is to prohibit the "use, distribution, or dissemination" of any nullified record in connection with employment,
bonding or licensing.7 3 An important section enables the unconvicted
arrestee to deny that any arrest, indictment, hearing, or trial ever occurred if inquiry is made for any purpose involving employment,
bonding or licensing.74 Section 7(d) allows the applicant for nullification to list all persons, offices, agencies and other entities which he
believes to have a copy of his record. Each person, office, agency or
entity receives a copy of the order of nullification if within the jurisdiction of the court of application.75 Section 8 provides that any officer or employee of the United States or any state who releases or disseminates arrest data or information concerning an indictment, trial
or hearing, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and subject to fine and
imprisonment if the record has been nullified.7 6 A final provision of
importance codifies the full faith and credit provision of the Constitu-

71.
Gough, The Expungeinent Of Adjudication Records Of Juvenile And Adult
Offenders: A Problem Of Status, 1966 WASH. U.L.Q. 147, 162 (1966).
72. 117 CONG. REc. at S 16,623 (daily ed. Oct. 20, 1971). These provisions are em-

bodied in sections 5(a) and (b) of the proposed act.
73.

Id. at S16,623. This protection is included in section 7(a) (1) of the proposed act.

74.

Id. at S 16,623; section 7(b).

75.

Id. at S16, 623-24.

76.

Id.atS16,624.
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tion and permits the record holder to have an order of expungement
77
or the like extended to each of the several states and the United States.
If enacted, the Offender Rehabilitation Act would alleviate much of
the discrimination suffered by unconvicted arrestees. Unfortunately
there are several serious shortcomings which could prevent effective
relief in a number of situations. The theory of nullification as an effective remedy is inadequate. Nullification presumes that if a particular
record is declared nullified by a federal court, the person or entity that
possesses the record will disregard an arrestee's past history and stop
discriminating. This presumption will not be true in numerous situations and discrimination will continue. Allowing retention without
placing strict limits on dissemination of retained records ignores the
fact that state statutes which have been in effect for years have failed
to control access to confidential records. Nullification would permit
the illegimate subsystem of information-peddling to continue.
Although the draftsmen recognized the extent of dissemination of
records to private interests, no effective mechanism was proposed to
give notice of nullification to the private concerns which possess
copies of the arrest record. Merely sending a copy of the order of nullification is inadequate. In addition, requiring the former arrestee to
provide a list of all the possible recipients of his record is an unreasonable burden. Tracing the numerous copies disseminated would be extremely difficult, and tracing the copies of the copies would be impossible! A final criticism is directed at the penalty section which has no
provision for relief against a private individual who may disseminate
damaging information. Prevention of private discrimination is essential. However, leaving the development of private remedies to state
legislatures is an unsatisfactory solution.
The proposed Offender Rehabilitation Act does not satisfy the requirements for an effective expungement system; it merely throws a
cloak of nullification over the system that penalizes the unconvicted
arrestee. The underlying system itself must be attacked. The most efficient method of eliminating the discrimination is to remove its source,
the arrest records themselves. If a compelling necessity justifies retention of these records, the dissemination must be strictly limited. Even
if all the violations of the proposed Act could be prosecuted, which is

77.
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highly unlikely, many former arrestees already would have been
denied jobs they were seeking and would face possibly months of
delay before obtaining relief. A comprehensive retrieval system that is
based on limited dissemination of the arrest record prior to final disposition of the arrestee's case is needed. Then all copies of the record
of arrest, including copies of fingerprints and other identification data,
could be retrieved and destroyed if expungement is ordered.
CONCLUSION
Reform in the arrest record system is critically needed. On the judicial level, the Eddy-Menard standard should be applied. If the government cannot demonstrate a compelling necessity to retain an arrest
record, it will be expunged. If the government justifies retention, dissemination will be limited strictly to law enforcement agencies. This
procedure will satisfy valid law enforcement purposes without offending personal privacy or reversing the presumption of innocence.
On the legislative level, a comprehensive federal plan is needed to insure that arrest records which are held beyond local jurisdiction can
be retrieved or that strict limits on dissemination will be complied
with. This solution will eliminate much of the present discrimination
against unconvicted arrestees.
William J. Leedom*

*
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